A Political and Historic Analysis of the Relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia: how the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has influenced U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East by Baalke, Caitlin
Seattle Pacific University
Digital Commons @ SPU
Honors Projects University Scholars
January 1st, 2014
A Political and Historic Analysis of the Relationship
between the United States and Saudi Arabia: how
the relationship between the United States and
Saudi Arabia has influenced U.S. Foreign Policy in
the Middle East
Caitlin Baalke
Seattle Pacific University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/honorsprojects
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Near and Middle Eastern Studies
Commons
This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the University Scholars at Digital Commons @ SPU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ SPU.
Recommended Citation
Baalke, Caitlin, "A Political and Historic Analysis of the Relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia: how the relationship
between the United States and Saudi Arabia has influenced U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East" (2014). Honors Projects. 25.
https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/honorsprojects/25
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Political and Historic Analysis of the Relationship between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia: 
 
How the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has influenced U.S. Foreign 
Policy in the Middle East. 
 
By 
 
Caitlin Baalke 
 
 
Faculty Advisor, Reed Davis 
 
Second Reader, Bradley Murg 
 
 
A project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the University Scholars Program 
 
 
 
Seattle Pacific University 
 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
This research discusses the importance of the relationship between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia and how this relationship has influenced and shaped U.S. foreign policy in the Middle 
East. The relationship is framed by the international relations theory of neoclassical realism and 
the institutions theory of critical junctures. Through this framework, a historical and political 
case study is performed, analyzing the antithesis that the relationship has continued throughout 
history because of economic interests and oil. This paper discusses the alternative hypotheses 
and the other factors that have played an important role in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, 
and the factors that have played an important role in shaping the relationship between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia. 
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I. Introduction: 
 
Why is This Relationship Important? 
When discussing the topic of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
most people assume the answer to what shapes this relationship and what has shaped U.S. 
foreign policy is a simple answer: oil. However, when looking into the history of the relationship 
and looking into the political and historical turning points in the relationship, we can see that this 
relationship is more complex and more influential than one might first think. But if the 
relationship was completely economically based on oil, the questions of why there have been 
times of distrust and why the relationship has at times been less influential due to less friendly 
interactions, would not be relevant. 
The United States has been an important international actor since before the Cold War, 
when it emerged as an international superpower. There have been many international relations 
theories that have tried to explain the interactions made between two nations, which have led to 
international times of peace and war. Although it is not widely known how important the 
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia is, this relationship has shaped and 
influenced many major decisions the United States has made when regarding foreign policy. This 
relationship has influenced economic, diplomatic, and political decisions, including whether the 
U.S. will send troops into the Middle East and engage in a war. 
 
 
Why is this Study Influential in My Life?  
 I grew up in rural Alaska, where stores, paved roads, and hospitals didn’t exist. There 
was one church in each town, we might sing a few hymns along with someone in the community 
playing the piano and we would listen to the one pastor preach. The larger of the two towns, 
consisting of approximately 150 people, had close connections with the Graham family. Franklin 
Graham, his wife and daughter Sissy would come and stay during the summers. Our community 
had a tight connection with Samaritan’s Purse and the work they did in Russia. You could ask 
what denomination or type of churches I attended up until my 10th birthday, but I cannot say 
because I am not sure how to categorize them. When my mother moved my siblings and myself 
to the big city of Soldotna, approx. population: 6000, we attended a Bible Chapel that was about 
4 blocks away from our house. Our first week in Soldotna, I remember getting lost trying to find 
our way to church.  
 In the past few weeks I have been faced with the concept of theology resonating within a 
Church’s teaching. Prior to my time at SPU I was raised being told Catholic was not Christian. 
My father was raised strictly Reformed Calvinist and my mother tended to bring us to 
evangelically focused congregations. I would summarize my experience with faith and the 
church to be a synthesis of personal piety, true creationism, “sola scriptura,” that humans all are 
totally depraved and that we cannot get over our sin, and as Christians we have a complex 
relationship being in the world but not of the world. And because of my family’s background 
they do not understand my desire to work in politics.  
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 Scholarship in my field can be cultivated through the integration of multiple disciplines. 
My particular focus is in conflict resolution, cross-cultural reconciliation, strategic negotiation, 
and international relations/affairs. This requires an understanding of multiple disciples, because 
every conflict, disagreement, and relationship is an isolated incident that can only be fully 
understood within the context of many other factors, some of which include: economics, laws, 
treaties and agreements, power, cultural and social norms, the development of thought, and 
history. I was drawn to politics because it combines economics, sociology, psychology, law, and 
philosophy. Faith intersects with the study of politics through the historical aspects of faith, how 
it relates to culture, and in some cases such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, faith and religion can be 
influential in making and maintaining laws and power.  
I believe God has called us to live in the world and of the world, to be lawmakers, 
peacekeepers, people who seek to understand others, and reconcilers. To be able to fulfill this 
calling, it is important to understand human nature and human behavior and how these aspects 
influence individuals, institutions, and the interactions made between them in conflict over 
power and money. It is hard to understand human nature and human behavior without having an 
understanding of morality and where morality is cultivated in a society. “Christian scholars’ 
work may also involve analysis of how humans construct moral systems to serve cultural 
functions” (Marsden). It is easy to become part of the conflict over power, but I believe my faith 
has given me an optimistic view of human nature, that reconciliation and conflict resolution is a 
possibility, and working as a moral force influencing these interactions is an acceptable calling 
for a Christian. 
 I believe I can be a Christian and be called to work in the world and work for the world, 
that there is no difference between what is sacred and secular. Even though, at times my past 
beliefs haunt me and tell me that I am wrong and that using that statement is an excuse to support 
my desire to work in politics. I constantly struggle with finding a middle ground for my life 
goals, vocation, and faith. Jacobson speaks of human beings being curious and creative and that 
scholarship is in our nature through our innate desire to learn and innovate.  
 Scholarship, to me, is the ability to continue that innate desire through a dialectical 
process, trial and error, always questioning what is fact and known. “Scholarship requires the 
hard work of researching one’s projects, carefully developing one’s own perspective, and then 
sharing those new intelligently crafted creative insights with others.”1 I follow along the beliefs 
that true genius is found in the creation of ideas, art, and technology. True scholars are dedicated 
to cultivating their creative sides through “paying attention to the world” and using their hard 
work and research to “intervene, encourage and discourage certain outcomes.”2 Through the 
attention paid to the world one can discover isolated facts, but scholarship requires more than 
discovering information. Scholarship requires these facts to be analyzed and used and put into 
perspective “making connections across the disciplines, placing specialties in larger context, 
illuminating data in a revealing way, working to interpret, draw together, and bring new insights 
to original research.”3  
 I believe my honors project is taking all of these scholarly models into consideration.  
One paper may not be enough to make a major difference in my field of study, but it will 
hopefully encourage further debate. My project will look at how a relationship between two 
countries has been influential in the decision of when and when not to go to war, how a 
relationship can influence these types of decisions, and how a relationship can change and 
impact future decisions. I will be looking at a country that has been often overlooked when it 
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comes to political and economic influence and shed light on how this country has influenced 
years of foreign policy through a neoclassical realist international theory.  
My proposed honors project topic stewards my personal intellectual gifts through my 
ability to retain and process large amounts of information. An academic research topic such as 
the one I have chosen to study will take time and will require the synthesis of multiple 
disciplines and a vast amount of information in these various subject. It will require an ability to 
synthesize large quantities of data along with the understanding of different cultures and ideas 
and how they interact. I have a love of culture that extends beyond the typical Western border 
and have cultivated an ability to understand foreign social norms. I enjoy exploring new cultures 
through the people I meet and learning about how they view the world. I think my intellectual 
gifts include being able to relate to people all over the world and having the desire to understand 
and listen to thoughts foreign to my own.  
 
1. The Question: 
How has the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia influenced U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East? Specifically, how has this relationship evolved and changed 
over time, and how has it changed how the United States has been involved in Middle Eastern 
policy formation? 
 
2. The Arguments: 
A. The United States’ interests in the Middle East revolve around the oil economy. 
The United States initiated the relationship to establish American companies in 
Saudi Arabia to share and exploit their resources through mutual economically 
beneficial agreements.  
B. The United States’ interests in the Middle East initially revolved around the oil 
economy. The interest in oil came about after WWI and WWII, as military 
technological advances required the oil. As the relationship developed, specific 
national security interests created new institutions, which changed the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship. Events, which ad hoc can be viewed as critical junctures, revolving 
around national security and economic security established new institutions, 
which have created a more complex form of interactions shaping U.S. Middle 
Eastern policies.  
C. The United States has always been most interested in the monetary value creating 
the economic relationship with Saudi Arabia. This relationship has used national 
security interests as a façade. The relationship’s main focus is on gaining and 
exploiting resources for both nation’s individual and mutual gain.  
 
Strategic Outline: 
 The purpose of this paper is to discuss the influence of the relationship between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia in shaping U.S.-Middle Eastern policies. This study will discuss 
the importance of the relationship, through a basic historical summary of the relationship, which 
will touch on external factors and events. The question will be dissected and answered through a 
political/historical case study, using neoclassical realism and critical juncture theory. These 
theories will provide the guidelines for testing each possible hypothesis and discuss the validity 
of each one’s argument.   
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 This paper is composed of 5 parts. First the introduction, second the empirical 
background, third the theory, fourth the case study, and finally the conclusion. Each part is 
composed of various sub sections discussing the topic further in depth. The introduction will also 
discuss the importance of the discussion of this relationship, the defining question of the paper, 
the arguments, and the strategic outline. The empirical background will give a basic 
historical/political summary focusing on a few major influential aspects of the relationship 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and will conclude by identifying and emphasizing 
important events, questions, and mysteries to the relationship. This section will also define the 
hypotheses and discuss their alternatives. The theory section will first discuss the development of 
the neoclassical realist theory, it will summarize the theory, discuss important variables and 
causal factors, it will discuss the variables specifically important for this case study, it will 
briefly discuss critical juncture theory, and will explain the critical junctures specifically 
important to this question. The case study section will be the analysis and testing of each 
hypothesis through the use of the neoclassical realist framework and through discussing the 
importance of critical junctures in combination with important variables and causal factors. The 
conclusion of this paper will discuss what can be learned from this relationship, and what we can 
learn that is applicable to explaining the current situation between U.S.-SA relations, current, and 
future U.S. foreign policies.   
 
II. Empirical Background: 
 
3. Summary 
A. The founding of Saudi Arabia 
The history of Saudi Arabia begins in Najd. This was the location where 
Mohammad al Saud and Mohammad ibn Abdullah al Wahab grew up. Mohammad al-
Wahab was a scholar who studied in Madinah, Iraq, and then Iran. He studied Islam 
under the Hanibali School. In 1744 Mohammad ibn Saud and Mohammad ibn Abd al 
Wahab swore a traditional oath to work together to establish an Islamic state.4 This 
agreement established a clear and defined mission to base their political authority upon 
and was created to justify their conquest of the peninsula.   
  Abdullah al Aziz ibn Saud, the son of Mohammad al Saud continued the conquest 
and founded modern Saudi Arabia. He was able to accomplish this through the use of the 
Ikhwan. The Ikhwan was a Wahhabi army. Early in the year 1902, Abd al-Aziz took 
Riyadh from the Al-Rashid family’s control. Abd al-Aziz had to fight the Al-Rashids of 
Ha’il and the Sherif of Mecca to fully gain control of the Arabian Peninsula. Abd al-Aziz 
became the only independent Arab leader after WWI. After founding Saudi Arabia, Ibn 
Saud had to destroy the Ikhwan because they became unmanageable. Their religious 
fervor and their deeply ingrained mission of conquest became an internal threat. The 
Ikhwan wanted to fight all non-Wahhabi Muslims. They had to be contained because Abd 
al-Aziz did not want to challenge British sovereignty to the north of the newly established 
Saudi State.  
Britain was in the Middle East because in 1912 the British converted their coal-
powered navy over to oil. In 1915 oil became a strategic commodity due to the First 
World War. Before WWI, the United States was the leading oil producer and exporter. 
Between the years 1923-28 British Petroleum showed no interest in going into Saudi 
Arabia. The United States began to compete with Europe for access to oil. This is what 
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initially brought the United States into the Middle East. In the 1920’s, due to 
overcapacity and over production, price wars became an issue. The financial stability of 
the oil industry became an issue for all countries involved. In 1928, the initial intent was 
for an oil cartel to be created to prevent the collapse of oil prices. In 1930 there was the 
worldwide depression. Oil was a strategic commodity at risk of price instability, due to 
war, overproduction, and underproduction. In 1932 Chevron/Bapco, also known as 
SOCAL, found oil in Bahrain, a small island outside the Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia, which was not affected by the “Red Line Agreement.” The “Red Line 
Agreement” initially kept many oil companies from going into areas of the Middle East 
in search of oil due to complicated oil sharing requirements. This agreement was created 
to prevent any one company from creating a monopoly on oil. In 1933 an U.S. company 
returned to Saudi Arabia in search of oil. The Saudi king welcomed the company because 
of his need for funds.  
 
B. ARAMCO History 
The first U.S. oil exploration in Saudi Arabia was in 1923 by the California 
Arabian Oil Company. CASOC shared the selling of oil found in Saudi Arabia to prevent 
an oil price collapse with TEXACO. After the worldwide depression, Europe and the 
U.S. began to extensively search for oil in the Middle East. Oil was first found on the 
Iranian side of the Persian Gulf. Oil was then found in Bahrain. Finally in the 1930s oil 
was found in the Eastern Province in Saudi Arabia. It was profitable because it was close 
to the surface, easy to extract, and inexpensive to extract.5 ARAMCO was established in 
1933 by CASOC, the year after King Abdulaziz completely took control of the Arabian 
Peninsula. ARAMCO stands for the Arabian American Oil Company; this name was 
changed in January of 1944.6 The first headquarters for ARAMCO were in San 
Francisco. In 1948 the Standard Oil of New Jersey, which is now known as Exxon Mobil, 
bought into ARAMCO. In 1950 Saudi Arabia began to pressure ARAMCO for better 
terms. When ARAMCO started splitting pretax profits 50/50, Saudi profits finally began 
to increase. Saudi Arabia received 56m in oil revenues that year and the next year that 
number doubled. In 1950 the Tapline pipeline was completed. It was only in 1952 that 
the headquarters where finally moved to Dhahran in Saudi Arabia where the SAUDI 
ARAMCO headquarters were founded. In 1962 the Saudi government created Petromin. 
In 1972 the Saudi government bought 25% into ARAMCO under the newly 
established government owned company known as Petromin. Saudi Arabia threatened to 
cut off oil from ARAMCO, who sells to 4 of the 7 largest oil companies in the world, due 
to the OPEC oil embargo. In 1974 Petromin purchased 60% of the company and the 
worldwide oil embargo ended. In the 1980s the Saudi government bought 100% of the 
company making ARAMCO a Saudi based company. The government completed its 
Saudiization goal. During the 1970s-80s ARAMCO began giving out scholarships to 
Saudi students, sending them abroad to foreign universities, to educated them and prepare 
them for management positions within the company. By 1980 around 15,000 Saudi 
students were studying abroad and about 70% were studying in the United States.7 
In 1984 EXXON, The Standard Oil of California, and Texaco owned 28.3% of 
ARAMCO, and Mobil owned 15%.8 During the early 1980s payments to the 4 “parent” 
companies were completed and in 1988 the Saudi government, who renamed the 
company SAUDI ARAMCO, officially owned ARAMCO.9 The state owned oil 
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company, Petromin, created a monopoly over the local distribution of oil but not a 
monopoly on the overseas distribution of the oil.10 Saudi Aramco was entrusted with the 
Saudi gas gathering system. The Eastern Province took over the regional electricity 
supply through the Saudi Consolidation Electric Company (SECO).11 By the 1990s Saudi 
ARAMCO acquired the responsibility over all Saudi domestic exploration and 
development of oil and energy resources.12 Saudi ARAMCO is continuing to grow, invest 
in foreign oil, and invest in newly found Saudi oil. The company now has one of the 
highest crude oil reserves in the world.13 Saudi ARAMCO is also known for hiring many 
Shi’ite workers.  
 
C. OPEC History 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries was created in September 
1960. OPEC was created to aid in oil producing countries gaining control over their 
resources. Abdullah Tariki from Saudi Arabia cofounded OPEC.14 Libya led the other 
OPEC countries in their demand for higher prices and tax rates in 1970.15 In 1972 he 
created a plan to transition oil companies from multinational corporations to the local 
peoples, many OPEC countries started nationalizing their oil between the years 1973-
75.16 Iran was the #1 producer of oil, until they began to use their oil as an anti-Western 
weapon. This did not work because there was enough oil available from other oil 
producing countries to make up for Iran sanctioning the exportation of their oil to 
Western countries, including the United States. Abdullah Tariki cofounded OPEC. The 
OPEC players were not in favor of the Camp David Accords. Saudi Arabia and Iraq made 
up 1/3 of OPEC’s productivity capacity.  
By 1973, Saudi Arabia and Iraq became cordial mainly because of their 
participation in OPEC. In 1973 war erupted in the Middle East, for some of the OPEC 
countries their only weapon was their oil. Saudi Arabia along with the other Oil Arab 
Producing Exporting Countries (OAPEC) used oil as a weapon.  Saudi Arabia used their 
oil as a weapon, through sanctioning countries that were in support of the Camp David 
Accords and Israel. Nixon provided Israel $2.2 billion in military aid. In 1973 the oil 
embargo was put into effect and a worldwide oil shortage was executed. OPEC then 
demanded higher oil prices. OPEC had the power over the prices and the oil market. 
Prices became so high in the 1970s that people began to be aware of their energy use and 
began to explore potential alternative sources of energy. Saudi Arabia, an OPEC leader, 
started feeling the effects of the embargo. Saudi Arabia’s economy relies mainly on oil, 
and because of this they prefer lower oil prices to maintain long-term stability in the 
market.17 
OPEC prices decreased in 1980-85, while Saudi Arabia increased their production 
of oil.18 OPEC began to guide OPEC country’s interests regarding policy formation. A 
prosperous West is important for many OPEC countries, including Saudi Arabia, because 
most of their investments are in countries associated with the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Saudi 
Arabia made up for the lack of their oil production, which made Saudi Arabia in control 
of producing 1/3 of OPEC’s total production. 
 
D. The Year 1979-1980 (Cold War/the Iraq-Iran War) 
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There were two major history-defining moments in the year 1979. The first was 
the Iranian Revolution. The second was the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan. The 
Soviet Union was encircling oil-rich countries. In 1979 Saudi Arabia broke their 
economic relations with Egypt, however this did not change the status of Egyptian 
workers living and working in Saudi Arabia. There was a lack of skilled manpower and 
forces in Saudi Arabia, and this caused them to consciously avoid any friction in their 
relationship with the Egyptian workers already in S.A.  
Between the years 1978-79, Iran was in chaos, Egypt was expelled from the Arab 
League, Syria was in disarray, and Iraq was quickly moving away from its previous 
isolation.19 Within Saudi Arabia, during 1979-1980, there was an uprising within the 
Shi’ite communities, particularly in Qatif in the Eastern Province. In 1979 forces within 
Saudi Arabia captured the Grand Mosque. It took the government troops two weeks to 
recapture the Mosque, with the aid of Jordan and France. However, the Saudi government 
will deny the aid because non-Muslims are forbidden to enter Mecca and the Mosque.20 
Within the greater Islamic world, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which 
was known for its strategic location as a buffer state between the Soviet Union and the 
Gulf states. In December 1979, the Soviets sent 80,000 troops into Afghanistan.21 In 
opposition of Soviet expansion, Saudi Arabia encouraged Muslim’s to fight against the 
Soviets and sent funds to support the resistance and opposition forces. The Middle East 
began to split, and Syria signed on with the Soviet Union, which upset Saudi Arabia.  
War broke out between Iran and Iraq in 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran. Saudi 
Arabia became vulnerable because of its support of Iraq. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) was officially announced in 1981, to build up a defense network against any 
invasion in the Gulf. Although, the GCC was first established in 1976 by Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.22 The purpose of the GCC 
was to unify economic, industrial, and defense interests between the countries. The GCC 
had difficulties maintaining financial support to Iraq because of the oil revenues going 
down in the 1980s.  
Saudi Arabia urged the United States to build an Iraqi oil pipeline through Saudi 
Arabia to increase Iraqi oil revenues.23 However, during the Iraq-Iran War, the United 
States remained neutral, and let Iraq and Iran fight without any intervention. The United 
States did attempt to repair relations with Iraq during the conflict, partly because the 
United States’ closest relations (Saudi Arabia and Jordan) urged the U.S. to improve their 
relations with Iraq.24 
Saudi Arabia initially upped their oil production to compensate for the loss of oil 
production during the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq-Iran War. However, in 1982 Iran 
and Nigeria were beginning to cheat the OPEC system. They overproduced oil without 
regarding how that might affect oil prices.25 Saudi Arabia had to cut production to 
prevent a price collapse. Iran and Nigeria’s actions caused the OPEC countries to be 
distrustful of one another, especially Saudi Arabia towards Iran. As Iran cheated and 
profited, Saudi Arabia had to practice restraint and their oil revenues suffered because of 
Iran’s actions.26 
 
E. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
In the year 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. “Kuwait had been actively producing oil 
well beyond its allotment,”27 while Iraq’s economy was slowly repairing itself and 
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recovering from the Iraq-Iran War. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Iraq took control of 19% 
of the world’s total oil.28 Iraq invaded Kuwait because Iraq viewed Kuwait cheating the 
system by over producing as an act of war against the other oil producing countries. This 
is how Iraq justified its invasion of Kuwait.  
During this invasion, the United States was not content with sitting back and 
letting Kuwait and Iraq fight it out. The United States did not remain neutral. The United 
States’ assistance in expelling Iraq from Kuwait proved many of the Saudi leaders wrong 
about the reliability of the U.S. “Prince Bandar and King Fahad thought that the U.S. 
would prove themselves unreliable.”29 A major reason the United States got involved was 
because of the strong probability of Iraq, after taking control of Kuwait, moving on to 
invade Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi troops were sending troops through the Saudi borders. 
The United States and Saudi Arabia knew that if they allowed Iraq to seize Kuwait, the 
entire Middle East would be at risk of attack and Iraq would be capable of conquering the 
Gulf and the majority of all the world’s oil reserves. The Middle East would no longer be 
as it was, and institutions such as the GCC and OPEC would be at risk of extinction.  
The Saudi oil market began to increase, but because of the large sums of debt that 
Saudi Arabia was acquiring to protect their kingdom and expel Iraq from Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia’s economy became stagnant. They gained profits because with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, Saudi Arabia maintained their status as the “swing producer” and 
compensated for the lack of Soviet oil. In the 1990s, Saudi Arabia created a stock 
exchange to increase revenues within the kingdom.  
Kuwait was part of the GCC, as well as an oil rich OPEC country. Iraq wanted to 
expand into the Gulf. This was a surprise for Saudi Arabia, who had been funding and 
supporting Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War. Now Iraq was invading their close ally, which 
put them in a tricky situation. They called on the U.S. for military support, taking out 
large loans to pay for the majority of all the costs to have U.S. troops go into Kuwait and 
protect the kingdom against an attack. Desert Storm and Desert Shield were very 
expensive, however, for the Saudis pushing Iraq out of Kuwait and protecting the 
Arabian Peninsula was worth the monetary cost.   
 
4. Conclusion 
Through this background we can better understand the impact the oil has on the 
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. We also can see how oil has been 
majorly influential due to the importance of stable oil prices worldwide. This is why it is 
important to note the events when oil has been used as a weapon by Iran and Middle East in 
1973-74.  
Another important take away from this background summary is how many countries in 
the Middle East have proven to be instable and have been unreliable when it came to their 
agreements and relationships with one another. This has caused distrust among the Middle 
Eastern countries and it has caused suspicion among the West as they choose which countries 
to rely on in diplomatic and economic terms.  
Questions to consider are: when did oil become a national security issue? Why did oil 
become a national security issue? How has oil influenced the relationship between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia? How has this relationship been influential putting the oil aside? 
What institutions have majorly impacted the relationship between the United Sates and Saudi 
Arabia?  
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5. Hypotheses and Alternatives 
A. The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States has solely been 
based on shared economic interests. 
B. This relationship has been initially guided by economic interests that through 
institutional change brought about by critical junctures has led the relationship to 
be influenced by mutual national security interests.   
C. The relationship has revolved around economic interests, and national security 
interests were used as a false motivation behind manipulative coercive economic 
factors.  
 
III. Theory: 
1. The Development of Neoclassical Realism 
Neoclassical realism was developed as a more methodological approach to 
theorizing about international relations. Neorealists made efforts to subconsciously 
address the questions of why wars occur, why balances of power develop, and why 
cooperation can be difficult. Neoclassical realists utilized these efforts and incorporated 
the positivist methodology that the classical realists lacked. They approached the 
international field with the assumption that it is possible to derive testable hypotheses and 
specify predictions and/or observable implications of the hypotheses to then test the 
hypothesis against the neoclassical realist theory and alternative hypotheses using 
empirical evidence. They come at the problem with a top down view of the state.  
For neoclassical realists states are the most important actors, and within the 
definition of the state, this includes both key decision-makers and key institutions. The 
state then acts by assessing threats, and those who respond to the threats then adjust the 
state’s strategy within the international arena. This “must start with the elites’ 
recognizing the shifts in the distributions of power, the changes in the intentions of other 
states and non-state actors.”30 The elites’ are defined as economic state actors and 
domestic groups.  
Like realists, neoclassical realists view politics as a struggle for material power 
and security in a world full of scarce resources and inescapable uncertainty. Because of 
these assumptions, neoclassical realists view foreign policy to be directly related to and 
driven by a state’s material power. There are two combined variations within neoclassical 
realism. The more state-centered realism, in which nations try to expand their political 
interests abroad due to the perceived increase and/or shift in power by key decision-
makers. The second is defensive realism, in which nations try to expand their political 
interests abroad due to the perceived increase of threats by key decision-makers.  
Different theorists have been able to use this theory that was created in 1991 to 
explain various changes and shifts in power in the international arena. Thomas 
Christensen used the neorealist theory to explain the inflation of external threats to 
mobilize campaigns. Aaron Friedman used the theory to explain adaptation leading to 
relative decline in power. Randall Schweller used the theory to explain alignment 
decisions leading to state motivations. Jack Snyder used the theory to explain reckless 
expansion. Willian Wohlforth used the neoclassical realist theory to explain how 
perception of the balance of power leads to state behaviors. Lastly Fareed Zakaria used 
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the theory to explain normal expansion. Zakaria explains how a balance of power is an 
outcome of several unintended actions taken by states, and these unintended actions 
means that it does not take a bad state to create bad outcomes. 
 
2. Theory Summary 
Neoclassical realism starts with the assumption that states are rational actors. 
Because states are viewed as rational actors, we know that “states do not willingly place 
themselves in situations of increased dependence.”31 
“Neoclassical realism tries to explain the outcomes of state interactions.”32 This 
theory can frame and explain how a bilateral relationship is affected by the distribution of 
material power and can lead to differences in foreign policy. “Neoclassical realists argue 
that relative material power establishes the basic parameters of a country’s foreign 
policy.”33 The neoclassical realist theory seeks to explain why different states pursue 
different paths at different times to pursue particular self-centered strategies in 
international foreign policy. Because states react differently to similar systematic 
pressures and opportunities, and this leads to reactions that are more motivated by 
domestic factors rather than systemic-level factors. An important aspect of this theory is 
that it acknowledges the fact that countries give perceptions a high importance when 
shaping foreign policies. Neoclassical realism focuses on the behavior of individual states 
and individuals within the states. It also takes into account the international environment 
and the international constraints in the shaping of foreign policy. Neoclassical realism 
combines structural and domestic variables to explain state behaviors. Neoclassical 
realists respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy through creating policies to 
control and shape the international environment. “Under the neoclassical realist theory, 
an analyst wanting to understand any case needs to do justice to the full complexity of the 
causal chain linking relative material power with foreign policy outputs.”34 First through 
using intellectual systems, second by tracing the actual case, and third by making sense of 
the relative power and the behavior of the state actors. This can also be described as the 
stages of a state’s behavior beginning with the strategic assessment, which leads to the 
formulation of a strategy, and then the implementation of the strategy. The strategies 
include assessing the commitment issues of the state, informational problems, and if 
states can balance against threats, these all can be determined by looking at the domestic 
political processes of the state. The assessment and formulation of a security strategy can 
be a determined in combination with systemic factors. Neoclassical realists believe that 
an increase of material power is directly related to the expansion of a country’s foreign 
policy and that an international environment should be analyzed at both a domestic and 
international level. 
 
3. Important Variables and Suggested Causal Factors 
The most influential variable in the neoclassical realist theory is the state. 
“Neoclassical realism identifies the states as the most important actors in international 
politics.”35 The state includes: leadership/elites’/decision makers’ perceptions, key 
institutions, and the state structure. “A theory of foreign policy must not ignore domestic 
politics, national culture, and individual decision-makers.”36 The way that individual 
decision makers are involved in shaping foreign policy is partly through their own 
personal preferences, heuristics, and biases. This can be through assessing the intentions 
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and capabilities of states rising in power, the impact of individual leaders, and the 
ideologies one might have about the feasibility of a strategy.  
Another important variable is the international structure. “States assess and adapt 
to changes in their external environment due to their specific domestic structures and 
political situations.”37 States have complex domestic political processes, in which they 
direct and redirect policy outcomes in response to external forces. One type of external 
force could be a shift or perceived shift in relative power; this leads to the creation of 
policy outcomes through the domestic political process specific to the state. “Systematic 
pressures are filtered through intervening domestic variables to produce different foreign 
policy behaviors.”38 The international system including the outcomes: war, peace, and 
balances of power. These all are the results of interactions of several states within an 
international context.  
The institutions within the state and international system are the rules of the game, 
and the parameters are set through a combination of international opportunities and the 
level of an external threat. Some aspects of foreign policy include: defying the system 
and/or domestic-level explanations. The character of and venue of a policy can be shaped 
through structural institutions. Structural institutions include: the executive branch which 
can be dominant in the national security arena, the policy entrepreneurship presented 
through think tanks, and specifically for the United States, the dominance of Wilsonian 
ideals have been an institution that has influenced foreign policy decisions.  
The variables that are influential in the discussion of neoclassical realism include: 
the capacity of politico-military institutions, the influence of domestic, societal actors, 
and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, the level of elite and/or 
societal cohesion, and the leaders’/statesmen’s’ perception/assessment of international 
threats and opportunities. The actual diplomatic, military, and/or foreign economic 
policies selected by the state and the distribution of power among states. The discussed 
unit-level variables can constrain and/or facilitate the state’s ability to respond to 
systemic imperatives, which means they are filtered through economic and social 
constraints that are placed on key political decision makers. The systemic incentives and 
constraints move and process the perceptions and options creating actual diplomatic, 
military, and foreign economic policies that states choose.  
Especially when regarding how the neoclassical realist theory can explain U.S. 
foreign policy, Fareed Zakaria argues that it is not the state but instead the statesmen who 
are the primary actors in international affairs/foreign policy creation. It is their 
perceptions of power shifts rather than actual objective measures of power shifts that are 
influential in shaping a state’s actions in the international arena. Secondly he would argue 
that the state structure is important, because a statesman can only exploit the power 
resources through the state’s structure, and that foreign policy is a product of state power.  
Fear and perceptions of fear contributes to the way in which groups form within a 
state. These perceptions and threats lead to individuals and groups to unite for security 
reasons leading to collective goals. Historically, this fear has often been directed at 
internal and external minority groups through what is commonly known as xenophobia. 
These collaborative groups can then influence the states’, statesmen’s, and the elites’ 
choices of action. This fear causing group formation can be explained through the realist 
theory’s views on social development.  
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4. Variables Specific to this Case Study 
• Monetary support (loans, funds, and backing a war/conflict financially) 
• Military support (military training, military force, and arms sales) 
• Manipulation of oil prices (taxes, decreasing production, increasing production, 
increasing prices, and decreasing prices) 
• Coercive international policies (oil as a weapon, sanctions, embargos, assassinations, 
closing borders, acts of war, and attacks on embassies) 
• Diplomatic relations (OPEC, OAPEC, UN, Camp David Accords, OECD, Islamic 
Conference Organization, GCC, Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, perceptions, interests, and deals) 
 
5. Critical Juncture Theory 
The impact that institutions have on politics and policies is not limited to a short 
period of time; they can extend over long periods of time. Governments often make the 
initial policies; the institutional choices remain the same until there is a force able to 
overcome the “inertia created at the inception of the program.”39 Path dependency is the 
logic and self-reinforcing properties of particular national trajectories over time.  Often 
rational individuals, who are pursuing their goals and imposing their will on others, 
create these institutions and governmental policies. Critical junctures are crucial founding 
moments of institutions that send countries along broadly different developmental paths. 
These junctures may lead to new actors, groups and/or the reorganization of political 
relations.  These outcomes may vary and the types of institutions that follow the critical 
juncture also may vary. “Once an institution is in place, actors adapt their strategies in 
ways that reflect but also reinforce the ‘logic’ of the system.”40 Policy feedbacks are 
mechanisms that can point to the self-reinforcing logic of the institutions and can be 
related to distributional effects of the institutions. “Political arrangements and policy 
feedbacks actively facilitate the organization and empowerment of certain groups while 
actively disarticulation and marginalizing others.”41 Institutional change includes 
informal distributions of power, observable attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of political 
actors. Behaviors and goals of individuals and collective actors can change the 
distribution of power amongst them. The identity of institutions and political actors is 
often a result of political conflicts and struggles for power. Historical institutionalism is 
valid because institutional change is an ongoing process.  
 
6. Suggested Critical Junctures 
Looking into both the critical junctures influencing U.S. interests and Saudi 
interests may help explain the changes in the relationship being viewed from a 
neoclassical realist standpoint.  
 
One may infer that there may be 6 major critical junctures influencing U.S. 
interests include: WWII, the oil shock of 1973-1974, 1979 Iranian Revolution, the Cold 
War beginning around 1980, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the 2001 9/11 
terrorist attack.  
 
One may infer that there may be 5 major critical junctures influencing Saudi 
interests include: the Camp David Accords in 1967, 1970 with Libya and OPEC countries 
demanding higher prices and tax rates and the transfer from companies having the power 
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over oil production to the countries which happened after the Libyan sunken oil tanker, 
1979 with the Iranian Revolution, attack on the Grand Mosque, and the Shi’ite revolts, 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the war on terrorism which officially began in 
2001.   
 
7. Linkages 
The Iranian Revolution paralleled the Cold War with the extent that extremism 
can infect a society, however these two are examples of extremism infecting a society on 
opposite sides of the spectrum.  
 
The instability of the Middle East and the unpredictability of Middle Eastern 
relations have caused distrust within many interactions. Some examples include Iraq 
invading Iran and then turning and invaded the Gulf through Kuwait, after much of their 
financial support came from these countries during their first war. Another example is 
Syria siding with the Soviets during the Cold War, and Iran, who had close relations with 
the U.S. through the Iranian Revolution, became known for their anti-American and anti-
Western attitudes.  
 
IV. Case Study: 
Starting in the 1930s the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia began 
firstly because of mutual economic interests, but also because oil was a strategic commodity due 
to WWI. The Saudi king was poor and needed the funds to maintain the state he created. The 
United States needed the oil and the U.S. oil companies profited most. The United States’ 
interest in Saudi oil increased during WWII so much so that the U.S. government considered 
buying CASOC, but did not due to private business rights. Oil was an increasingly important 
strategic commodity during WWI and WWII. Saudi Arabia and the access to oil became the 
center of the West’s strategic concern with the need for cheap and reliable sources of oil during 
the reconstruction of Europe after WWII. Also, oil became necessary for international economic 
stability.42 
In 1945 Saudi Arabia declared war with Germany to qualify for U.N. membership, 
however they had no military. The Saudi government perceived having a military as an internal 
threat. In 1945, the U.S. provided Saudi Arabia with an air base in Dhahran. This was beneficial 
to the United States because of the strategic location during WWII.  
 In 1951 the US Military Training Mission for SA was created.43 By 1962 the king 
cancelled the U.S. base in Dhahran mainly because having the U.S. military on Saudi soil, was a 
perceived threat to Saudi sovereignty. However, the king did want USMTM to be a continued 
U.S. commitment to the defense of Saudi Arabia. There was an oral commitment from every 
U.S. president starting with Roosevelt, agreeing to defend Saudi sovereignty, the Saudis take oral 
commitments very seriously. The U.S. embassy in Saudi Arabia kept a record of these continued 
promises,44 and the Saudi government took these very seriously. In return the Saudi king would 
promise that Saudi Arabia would remain a constant stable source of oil to the West. He promised 
that the oil would continue flowing at moderate prices in accordance with the world’s needs. 
This was also essential for the Saudi Arabian economy. Because maintaining oil as the energy 
source of choice for the world is what continues to drive Saudi progress. Their future, security, 
and stability are perceived as directly related to the stability, security, and future of oil as the 
commodity of choice.  
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We can then wonder if the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was 
completely economically based on oil, why did this change or when did this change? Throughout 
the history of this relationship we find there are times of distrust, and that the relationship has 
been less influential due to less friendly interactions.  
The 1960s brought about distrust in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States mostly because of U.S. foreign policies and/or lack of presence during the Egypt-Saudi 
proxy war. In the 1960s, major factors that played into Saudi foreign policy include the impact of 
civil unrest, threats of revolution, and internal family issues. Saudi Arabia lacked the skilled 
work force they needed because they had a lack of education, and because of that they relied 
heavily on foreigners. They also lacked a military. They relied on the prestige that comes with 
having control over Mecca and Medina, and relied on Wahhabism to justify their sovereignty. 
Another major factor that played into Saudi foreign policy during the 1960s was the conflict 
within Yemen, which turned into a proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia 
was afraid of the possible destabilizing threat of Nasserism, mainly because Nasser’s goal was to 
“crush the authority of the Saudi Arabian Government.”45 During these years, Kennedy was 
president. Kennedy pushed domestic reform in Saudi Arabia instead of military support, 
especially during the conflict with Yemen because he believed through the advising of his 
administration that “military measures in support of the Saudi Arabian Government may be 
largely ineffective unless that Government is capable of sustaining the loyalty of the armed 
forces and finding an effective base of support within Saudi Arabia.”46 At this time Komer, 
Kennedy’s Middle East point of contact and advisor, was advising Kennedy “the Saudis 
themselves must press forward with modernization and development. Deliberate, controlled 
internal reform is the best antidote to Nasserism.”47 Saudi Arabia abolished slavery, mainly to 
show the United States that they were working towards modernizing their country, however the 
Saudi Government saw reform as a destabilizing force. They relied on a reduced pace of 
development to maintain their Islamic conservative values in both their political and social 
arenas. Maintaining the Islamic and Wahhabi connection is perceived as very important in 
supporting the legitimacy of the Saud family’s rule within Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. 
Saudi Arabia was and is perceived as the leader in the Muslim World. Nasser’s attack on Saudi 
Arabia threatened this perception along with the legitimacy of the Saud rule and the protection of 
the Muslim holiest cities.  
Arab radicalism was viewed as a threat to Saudi Arabia and during the 60s-70s Saudi 
Arabia heavily relied upon their economic institutions to provide stability. This however is tricky 
because inequality in social mobility and opportunity could become a destabilizing factor as their 
economy grew. The Saudi leadership wanted efficiency and power, major reforms were 
perceived as losses of power and the reform Saudi Arabia was looking for was economic 
efficiency rather than political policy reform.  
In 1967 during the Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia became weary of the trustworthiness 
of the United States due to the Camp David Accords and the United States’ unfair military 
support of Israel over Egypt within the conflict. Saudi Arabia had no military until 1967, which 
changed due to this conflict. Saudi Arabia became skeptical of agreeing and siding with the 
United States because of their strong connection and relationship with Israel. This distrust and 
conflict over land between the Middle East and the West led up to the Oil Shock of 1973-74.  
However, what really led up to the Oil Shock of the 70s was the fact that in 1970 Libya 
led the institutional shift of the power over oil prices and oil production from private companies 
to government owned entities. After the oil tanker went down, the OPEC countries started taking 
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control of their oil. This gave these countries who previously had no influence, lots of power in a 
very short time. Saudi Arabia took their time in switching the oil company over from private 
U.S. companies, they took years to shift ownership over to Petromin, the Saudi Arabian 
governmental oil company. This change in ownership was the beginning of a major shift in 
power and caused major institutional change. This change led to the OPEC and AOPEC 
countries having power over prices and power over oil. This is what allowed these countries to 
facilitate the oil embargo in 73-74. This one incident in Libya led to the oil shock through giving 
the OPEC countries the power to use oil as a weapon.  
During this time, we see Saudi Arabia continuing to be dependable in one incident during 
the oil shock. At this time the United States was overseas fighting the Vietnam War. Oil is 
essential during a war because of its importance and necessity for modern military warfare. With 
the Middle East’s embargo and a worldwide oil shortage, this could have set the United States 
back immensely during this war. Saudi Arabia, although they were embargoing the United States 
along with the other Middle Eastern oil producing countries, they were sending oil directly to the 
U.S. military in Vietnam. They were sending enough oil to maintain U.S. troops in Vietnam. 
This war changed the worldwide perception of the United States as being an invincible force 
with an invincible military. This war also proved the reliability of Saudi Arabia as a strategic ally 
for the United States while the entire Middle East targeted the world’s economic stability by 
producing and creating a worldwide shortage. Saudi Arabia, of course, was providing this oil for 
its own economic gain. Saudi Arabia needs a constant flow of oil and moderate prices to provide 
and maintain long-term economic stability; their economy and development is primarily based 
on the exportation of oil.  
The next major shift in the relationship happened in the year 1979. There was a spread of 
Arab radicalism across the Middle East and the Islamic World. Arab radicalism is anti-colonial, 
anti-Western, populist, anti-monarchal, progressive, secularist, and pro-Soviet Union. This 
radicalism led to the combination of war and oil being used as a weapon as the action plan of 
both Sadat and Assad in Libya and Syria. Iran was known for the using of oil as a weapon 
against the United States. The Iranian Revolution caused a major shift in power within the 
Middle East. Firstly because Iran thought that they could cut off oil to the United States to coerce 
them into changing their policies towards the Iranian leadership. Arab radicalism was found 
within the uprisings, which became violent and led to an Iranian attack on the United States 
embassy. Historically the United States and Iran had been allies since the 1950s. Due to this shift 
in power and the relationship, the United States imposed sanctions on Iran, and Saudi Arabia 
started producing more oil to compensate for the lack of oil being sent from Iran to the United 
States.  
Along with the economic power shift from Iran to Saudi Arabia and the shift from one 
Middle Eastern ally defaulting in the relationship causing the United States to rely more on the 
stability of their relationship with Saudi Arabia, the other major factor that changed and 
realigned the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia was the worldwide shift in 
power as the Soviet Union became a superpower. With the Soviet Union coming to power, they 
led the spread of Communism which fueled the Cold War.  
Saudi Arabia became a major ally to the West because of its strategic position between 
the West and Russia, because of its access to the strategic commodity: oil, and because Saudi 
Arabia had a strong religious desire to quench Arab radicalism and Communism. They found 
their fervor within their strong Wahhabi background. Communism and Arab radicalism 
threatened the Saud monarchy and threatened the sovereignty of the Saud family and Saudi 
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Arabia. The Middle East split as Egypt and Syria sided with the Soviet Union and with the 
Iranian Revolution. Along with this split, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which was 
viewed as a major buffer state between the Soviets and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia and the 
United States aligned themselves because both saw the spread of Communism and the Soviet 
Union as a major threat.  
Saudi Arabia did not have the military power to fight the Soviets directly, but they used 
religion to inspire the Afghani forces to fight off the Soviet invaders. They also used their 
financial capital to support and fund resistance forces in Afghanistan and throughout the Middle 
East. The ideological threat was real to Saudi Arabia. We can see this in 1979, with the seizure 
of the Grand Mosque. It took Saudi Arabia weeks, with the aid of France and Jordan, to take 
back the Grand Mosque from Saudi rebels. Along with this internal threat, there were the Shi’ite 
revolts which were mainly situated in the Eastern Province and in Qatif. These revolts were 
inspired by the Iranian Revolution. The conflicting Shi’ite-Sunni ideology became a major 
internal and external threat to Saudi sovereignty as Iran overthrew the Shah.  
1979-1980 became a major defining moment in U.S.-S.A. relations. Many institutions 
changed, including how Saudi Arabia became involved in the Cold War and the United States 
going into Afghanistan. These institutions and the relationship remained constant through 2001. 
The ideology behind Arab radicalism, Islamic revolutions, the Arab Awakening, and the Afghani 
guerilla Muslim forces became a perceived “weapon” similar to oil in the 1970s. These 
ideologies became the force behind wars, revolutions, and became a political force. With the 
acceptance of religion and ideology becoming a political force we can better understand how 
terrorism and terrorist networks have become a political and ideological war stemming from the 
Cold War era. However, this analysis only touches on how this relationship has shifted into the 
Post-Cold War era. With this analysis we can better understand how the past has influenced the 
present, through better understanding the major defining critical junctures within a world whose 
international policies can be understood through the neoclassical realist theory. 
 
V. Conclusion: 
The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, throughout history has 
influenced U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. What began as a relationship reliant on mutual 
economic gain, evolved into a relationship that was also reliant on mutual national security 
interests. These policies and relationship changed when oil became a weapon of choice by 
various Middle Eastern countries, and Arab radicalism and the threat of Communism became 
present within the Middle East. We can see these changes through the times of war and times of 
peace. Different administrations have dealt differently with the oil policy, the instability of 
Middle Eastern countries, and financial situations, however the overarching relationship is more 
dynamic than it initially appears. The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia 
has been influenced by oil prices, oil stability, but also through mutual national security interests 
and American exceptionalism, depending on the administration. This has also caused a push 
back from some Middle Eastern countries, which are not ready for the domestic reforms that 
were expected by the United States. Saudi Arabia is one country that at times has avoided a 
direct relationship with the United States outside of national security issues and oil stability 
because of the threat of the destabilizing factors of revolution within their borders due to the 
quick expansion of modernization and development that might challenge the authority of the 
Saud monarchy.  
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“For half a century, America defended our own freedom by 
standing watch on distant borders. After the shipwreck of 
Communism came years of relative quiet, years of repose, years of 
sabbatical – and then there came a day of fire. Our country has 
accepted obligations that are difficult to fulfill, and would be 
dishonorable to abandon. Yet because we have acted in the great 
liberating tradition of this nation, tens of millions have achieved 
their freedom. And as hope kindles hope, millions more will find 
it. By our efforts we have lit a fire as well – a fire in the minds of 
men. It warms those who feel its power, it burns those who fight its 
progress, and one day this untamed fire of freedom will reach the 
darkest corners of our world.”48 
 
 Post 9/11, the United States had not established new foreign policies regarding the 
Middle East, rather it continued along the institutionally accepted policies, which were 
established in 1979-1980 with the Iranian Revolution and the Cold war. This is important to 
note, when discussing U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and the relationship with Saudi 
Arabia. With the current issues evolving in Syria, and with Saudi Arabia putting pressure on the 
United States to quell the conflict due to the insecurities they have with being surrounded by 
instable countries putting them at risk of spill over conflict. The Syrian conflict can be traced 
back to the Cold War and Iranian Revolution, and the relationship that it founded with the Soviet 
Union. The ideological differences between Saudi Arabia and the United States in contrast with 
Syria and Russia, bring back the same fears that S.A. had in the past when viewing Communism 
and Arab radicalism as a threat. Saudi Arabia is still at a point where it could not protect itself 
from an external invasion or an internal invasion. However, it has been working on building up 
its military and intelligence forces.  
 Currently we have seen the Saudi government viewing Syria, Iran, and Egypt as 
continued threats to their own stability, the threat of invasion and threat of ideological 
infiltration. The Arab Awakening has not been welcomed into Saudi Arabia. With the Obama 
administration, we see a change in foreign policy reverting to Kennedy Administration policies, 
pushing internal reform within Saudi Arabia rather than sending in U.S. troops whenever there is 
conflict or a threat to Saudi Arabia in the Middle East. These policies have caused distrust 
between Saudi Arabia and the United States. We will see how these policies change in the future, 
however, when looking at the Kennedy Administration’s success in their policies, it is likely to 
conclude that these policies will not last.  
 With more and more sects and cells of al-Qaeda popping up across the Middle East and 
Africa, it is likely that our policies and relationship with Saudi Arabia will need to change and 
become more proactive towards guiding these countries to find and accept the “fire of freedom” 
without being consumed by radical ideologies.  
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